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other undue means; 
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order the award upon rearbitration to be made within a reasonable 
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proceeding commences on the date of the court's order for 
rearbitration. 
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DETERMINATIVE COURT RULE 
Rule 4-501 Code of Judicial Administration. 
(3) Hearings. 
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* * * * 
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II. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Order that is the subject of this appeal is a final 
order and judgment of the Third Judicial District Court of Summit 
County. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). Pursuant to Utah R. 
App. P. 42 the Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal to the 
Court of Appeals for disposition by order dated August 26, 1992. 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
A. Did Appellant waive its rights to challenge the 
arbitration award the trial court confirmed? 
Because the resolution of this issue involves the review 
of written materials only, this Court reviews the evidence de novo. 
Matter of Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
B. Should this Court summarily affirm the trial court 
because Appellant failed to marshal evidence in its brief? 
Because this issue involves the contents of an appellate 
brief, this Court addresses it for the first time, and as a matter 
of discretion. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.. 746 P.2d 1182, 
1185 (Utah App. 1987). 
-1-
C. Should this Court summarily affirm the trial court 
because Appellant failed to comply with Utah R. App. P. 24(a)? 
Because this issue involves the contents of an appellate 
brief, this Court addresses it for the first time, and as a matter 
of discretion. Koulis v, Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 746 P.2d 1182, 
1185 (Utah App. 1987). 
D. Did the trial court err in concluding there was no 
competent evidence of fraud before it? 
Because the resolution of this issue involves the review 
of written materials only, this Court reviews the evidence de novo. 
Matter of Adoption of Infant Anonymous. 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
E. Did the trial court err in refusing to reconsider the 
damages the Arbitrator awarded Appellee? 
This Court reviews the trial court's interpretation of 
statutes such as the Utah Arbitration Act as a question of law. 
Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton. McConkie & Bushnell, 789 P.2d 
34, 37 (Utah App. 1990). Neither this Court or the trial court 
can, however, review the merits of the underlying arbitration award 
the trial court confirmed. City of Fairbanks Mun. Util. System v. 
Lees, 705 P.2d 457, 460 (Alas. 1985); Arizona Public Serv. Co. v. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.. 149 Ariz. 239, 717 P.2d 918, 922-
23 (App. 1985); Foust v. Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co., 786 P.2d 450, 451 
2 
(Colo, App. 1989); Harris v, Haucrht, 435 So.2d 926, 928 (Fla. App. 
1983); Jackson Trak Group v. Mid States Port Auth., 242 Kan. 683, 
751 P.2d 122, 127 (1988); Taunton Mun. Light Plant Comm'n v. 
Geiringer & Assoc., 560 F.Supp. 1249, 1252 (D. Mass.), aff'd. 725 
F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1983)(applying Massachusetts codification of 
Uniform Arbitration Act); Bvron Center Public Schools v. Kent 
County Educ. Ass'n., 186 Mich. App. 29, 463 N.W.2d 112, 113 (App. 
1990); Beebout v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 365 N.W.2d 271, 
273 (Minn. App. 1985); Holman v. Trans World Airlines. 737 F.Supp. 
527, 530 (E.D. Mo. 1989)(applying Missouri codification of Uniform 
Arbitration Act); Glasgow Educ. Ass'n. v. Board of Trustees, Valley 
County, 242 Mont. 478, 791 P.2d 1367, 1371 (1990); Turner v. 
Nicholson Properties, Inc., 80 N.C. App. 208, 341 S.E.2d 42, 45 
(App.) disc, review denied. 317 N.C. 714, 347 S.E.2d 457 (1986); 
Greater Johnstown Area Vocational-Technical School v. Greater 
Johnstown Area Vocational-Technical Educ. Ass'n., 88 Pa. 
Commonwealth Ct. 141, 489 A.2d 945, 948 n.4 (1985). 
F. Did the trial court err in ruling the election of 
remedies doctrine is inapplicable to this matter? 
Because the resolution of this issue involves the review 
of written materials only, this Court reviews the evidence de novo. 
Matter of Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Petitioner/Appellee Arthur Mintz, Trustee of the Mintz 
Family Trust ("Trust"), filed his Verified Petition for 
Confirmation of Arbitration Award (the "Petition") on October 10, 
1991. In the Petition, Trust requested confirmation of a May 30, 
1991 arbitration award (the "Award") against Respondent/Appellant 
Marc Development ("Development"). The amount of the Award is 
$188,500, plus interest from March 28, 1991. Development never 
sought to vacate the May 30, 1991 Award until it filed its November 
21, 1991 Reply to Trust's Petition, 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
On January 16, 1992 Trust filed its Motion for Judgment 
on the Pleadings (the "Motion"). (R. 19-20). After the parties 
fully briefed the Motion (R. 22-30; 36-64; 80-106), Trust filed its 
Notice to Submit Motion for Decision (R. 120-21). Trust 
concurrently filed its Affidavit of Attorney Fees, (R. 107-14). 
After the parties filed all memoranda and the Notice to 
Submit, Development filed an untimely Request for Oral Argument. 
(R. 115-16). Trust objected to that request and moved to strike 
it. (R. 117-19). The trial court granted Trust's Motion without 
a hearing. (R. 122). It awarded Trust its attorneys' fees, subject 
to Development's objection and the court's review. (R. 122). 
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Pursuant to the trial court's ruling, Trust filed a 
proposed Order and Judgment and served it on opposing counsel. (R. 
155) . Development objected to that proposed order and judgment 
(R.128-41), and requested oral argument on its objection. (R. 126-
27). Trust filed its response to Development's objection (R. 142-
48) , and objected to Development's request for oral argument on its 
objection. (R. 149-50). 
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT. 
The trial court overruled Development's objections to the 
Order and Judgment (R. 152) , and executed it. (R. 153-56)1. A 
copy of the trial court's Order and Judgment appears herein as 
Exhibit "A" to the Addendum. 
V. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On or about June 23, 1989 Trust and Development entered 
into a written contract for Trust to purchase from Development real 
property in Summit County known as Lot 37, Bald Eagle Club. (R.l, 
14) . As part of that contract, Trust and Development entered into 
a Letter of Guarantee (R.5, 6, 50-51, 136-37) memorializing the 
*Trust also filed its Motion for Review and Award of Attorney 
Fees. (R. 123-25). Development did not object to the attorney's 
fees sought by Trust. The trial court awarded Trust's attorneys' 
fees as prayed (R. 152), and executed an Order and Supplemental 
Judgment awarding Trust its attorneys' fees in the amount of 
$5,351.96. (R. 157-60). Development does not appeal that Order 
and Supplemental Judgment or the trial court's award of Trust's 
attorneys' fees. 
5 
parties7 rights and obligations to each other. (R. 2-3, 14). 
copy of that Letter of Guarantee appears herein as Exhibit "B" 
the Addendum. 
As relevant to the issues involved in this appeal, 
Letter of Guarantee provided: 
4. In addition, you [Trust] shall be 
guaranteed herein the following at the end of 
20 months from the date of closing: 
1. The lot shall be deemed to be worth 
10% above the original published price in 
Exhibit A by virtue of the following: 
a. Purchaser shall build or keep said 
lot. 
b. Seller shall have the obligation 
and option to pay the difference between 
Buyers sale price at that time and the 10% 
increase price as indicated below, or, 
c. At the Seller's option, Seller 
shall be obligated to purchase the lot for 
said amount of the guarantee indicated below, 
Original Price List Exhibit A for Lot #37 is 
$535,000.00 
Final Special Discount Price: $442,200.00 
Guaranteed Price at the end of 20 months: 
$588,500.00 
In order to guarantee that funds shall be 
available to support the above guarantees, 
Seller hereby agrees to deed into escrow with 
High Country Title Company, the deeds to four 
Bald Eagle Homesites free and clear of all 
encumbrances to inure to the benefit of the 
Buyers, the payment of said guarantees. These 
homesites shall be transferable and 
6 
nonexlusive [sic] so that a minimum of four 
homesites shall always remain in escrow 
throughout the 20 month period. 
(R. 5-6, 50-51, 136-37). 
As required by the Letter of Guarantee, Development 
placed four other Bald Eagle Club lots—11,12,18 and 19—in escrow 
with High Country Title Company, Park City, Utah. (R. 60-62). A 
copy of the Deposit in Escrow appears herein as Exhibit "C" to the 
Addendum. The Deposit in Escrow provided that those four lots 
would remain in escrow for 36 months, or until the conclusion of 
any pending litigation, to provide security for purchasers7 rights 
under various guarantees executed by Development. (R. 61, Exhibit 
"C" to Addendum). The Deposit in Escrow specifically designated 
Trust as a beneficiary. (R. 60, Exhibit "C" to Addendum). 
Trust determined not to keep or build on Lot 37 and tried 
to sell the lot. It received an offer of $400,000.00, and gave 
notice to Development on March 18, 1991 either to pay the 
difference ($188,500.00) or to repurchase the lot for $588,500.00. 
(R. 53) . Those were the two options available to Development under 
the Letter of Guarantee. Development refused, claiming the offer 
was inadequate, and that it accordingly would not repurchase the 
lot for $588,500.00. Development insisted that Trust must sell Lot 
37 for a more substantial price, use a real estate broker, pay the 
brokers commission, and receive no interest on its funds until it 
7 
sold Lot 37. Only then would Development agree to pay the 
difference between the gross sales price received by Trust and 
$588,500.00. (R. 53). 
Trust contended this was not the intention of the 
parties, not its understanding, and not an accurate interpretation 
of the Letter of Guarantee. Trust and Development could not 
resolve their differences concerning Developments obligations 
under the Letter of Guarantee. Consequently, Trust and Development 
designated Gregory S. Bell, Esq. of Salt Lake City to arbitrate the 
dispute. (R. 2, 15). Mr. Bell (the "Arbitrator") conducted an 
arbitration hearing where he took testimony and heard argument (the 
"Hearing") on May 17, 1991. (R. 2, 15). 
Before the arbitration, Trust and Development filed their 
respective summaries of the dispute to be arbitrated. (R. 53, 55-
56) . In particular, the parties fully empowered the Arbitrator to 
determine "(a) whether the offer submitted by [Trust] in the sum of 
$400,000 was a bona fide offer establishing the fair market value 
[of Lot 37] and, (b) who was to bear the costs of sale of the 
property." (R. 40) . Development argued throughout the arbitration 
process that the $400,000.00 figure was too low. Trust requested 
"a decision instructing [Development] to either accept the sales 
price and pay $188,500.00, plus reasonable interest to the date of 
8 
payment, or, in the alternative, to pay $588,500.00 and repurchase 
the tendered lot." (R. 53). 
The Arbitrator issued his award on May 23, 1991. (R. 
99) . The American Arbitration Association ("AAA") mailed copies to 
the parties that day. (R. 98). In this award the Arbitrator (1) 
determined the fair market value of Lot 37 to be $400,000.00; (2) 
ordered Development to pay Trust $188,8002, plus interest at 10% 
from March 28, 1991 until paid; (3) gave Development the 
alternative until May 30, 1991 of purchasing Lot 37 for $588,8003 
in cash; (4) required each party to pay customary closing costs if 
Development elected the repurchase option; (5) determined that 
Trust was not responsible for paying the real estate commission. 
Development did not meet the Arbitrators May 30, 1991 
deadline for repurchasing Lot 37. Development requested Trust to 
give Development a 45-day extension—until July 15, 1991—to 
purchase Lot 37 for $588,500. (R. 104). As an inducement to Trust 
to grant it this extension while forbearing from trying to collect 
on the Award, Development agreed to pay Trust interest "at the rate 
2Seven days later the Arbitrator issued, and the AAA mailed, 
his Amended Award (the "Award"). (R. 100-01). The Award was 
identical to the initial award except for the reduction of the 
award amount from $188,800 to $188,500. A copy of the Award 
appears herein as Exhibit "D" to the Addendum. 
3This amount was reduced by $300 to $588,500 in the Award. 
This reduction is explained in footnote 2, supra. 
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of 2 points over Harris Bank of Chicago's prime rate," rather than 
the 10% the Arbitrator awarded. (R. 104). A copy of this May 29, 
1991 extension appears herein as Exhibit "E" to the Addendum. 
Development did not exercise its extension on or before 
July 15, 1991. Consequently, Trust began efforts to enforce the 
Award. On July 16, 1991 Trust sent Development a Notice of Default 
and Breach of Agreement (the "Notice"). (R. 64). Trust advised 
Development in the Notice that Trust had requested High Country 
Title, the escrow agent under Developments Deposit in Escrow (R. 
60-62; Exhibit "C" to Addendum), to sell the four escrowed lots 
(lots 11, 12, 18 and 19), and to pay Trust $188,500, plus awarded 
interest, from the sale proceeds. A copy of the Notice appears 
herein as Exhibit "F" to the Addendum. 
On October 10, 1991 Trust filed its Verified Petition for 
Confirmation of Arbitration Award. (R. 1-7). Development raised 
no objection to the Award until November 21, 1991, when it filed 
its Answer to the Petition. (R. 14-17). 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. Development has waived its right to challenge the 
Award on any grounds. It has not marshaled any evidence as 
appellate rules require. It has not presented any legal argument 
on some issues. It has raised an issue not included in its 
docketing statement. This waiver and these failures to comply with 
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appellate rules justify summary affirmance of the trial court 
without reaching the issues Development raises. 
B. Development filed with the trial court an affidavit 
rife with hearsay, foundationless assertions, and unsubstantiated 
opinions. Trust timely objected to that affidavit. The trial 
court properly refused to consider the portions of that affidavit 
to which Trust objected. This Court should affirm the trial 
court's Order and Judgment because the record utterly lacks any 
competent evidence that Trust procured the Award through fraud. 
C. A trial court can vacate an arbitration award only on 
the grounds contained in applicable arbitration statutes. The Utah 
Arbitration Act does not permit the judicial review of damages 
requested by Development. 
D. The Deposit in Escrow secured buyers such as Trust in 
the event Development defaulted on obligations arising from 
Development's various guarantees. In the Award the Arbitrator 
ruled that, pursuant to the Letter of Guarantee, Development owed 
Trust $188,500 plus interest. Trust's efforts to satisfy the Award 
from the escrowed property is not an election of remedies, unless 
judicial enforcement of the Award permits a double recovery. 
Confirmation of the Award will not create a double recovery. 
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VII. ARGUMENT 
A. DEVELOPMENT WAIVED ITS RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE THE 
AWARD; ITS ATTEMPTS ARE ABSOLUTELY BARRED. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14(2) unambiguously provides: "A 
motion to vacate an award shall be made to the court within 20 days 
after a copy of the award is served upon the moving party. . .M 
(emphasis added). The Arbitrator served his Award on Development 
on May 30, 1991. AAA Rule 45 (R. 102, p. 19) defines delivery as 
occurring upon mailing. Accordingly, Development had to file any 
motion to vacate the Award not later than June 19, 1991. 
Development did not do so until more than five months after that 
deadline. (R. 14) . Consequently, it is absolutely barred from 
contesting Trust's Petition for Confirmation. 
Trust argued to the trial court the untimeliness of 
Development's effort to contest the Award. (R. 24-28, 85). 
Development does not claim on appeal that its effort to vacate the 
Award was timely.4 
When a party to an arbitration such as Development fails 
to move to vacate an award within the time limit prescribed by the 
statute, that party has waived its right to challenge the award. 
4Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14(2) does permit a motion to vacate 
based on the procurement of an award by fraud within 20 days after 
the grounds are known or should have been known. The record 
contains no indication that Development raised its purported fraud 
arguments within 20 days after it discovered the claimed fraud. 
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See Robinson & Wells P.C. v. Warren,, 669 P.2d 844, 848 n.6 (Utah 
1983) . The Idaho Supreme Court has explained the expansive nature 
of such waiver: 
Cases decided under the Uniform Arbitration 
Act(51 make it clear that this statutory time 
limitation is strictly construed and must be 
complied with before a court can vacate any 
award. This is true even if the party seeking 
to vacate the award asserts a valid ground 
under the act. 
A court cannot exceed this [20-] day period. 
Because the time limit under the act is 
strictly construed, failure to comply with 
that time limit raises an absolute bar to a 
motion to vacate. 
Bingham County Comm'n v. Interstate Electric Co. , 105 Idaho 36, 665 
P.2d 1046, 1049 (1983)(citations omitted)(emphasis provided by the 
court). 
It makes no difference that Development did not file a 
pleading specifically called a "motion to vacate:" 
The pleading filed by appellant is denominated 
an answer, but we think in legal effect it may 
be regarded as a motion to vacate the award, 
since it affirmatively sets out reasons why 
such should be done and prays that the award 
be vacated and that plaintiff take nothing. 
Giannopulos v. Pappas. 80 Utah 442, 15 P.2d 353, 355 (1932). 
5Utah, along with 33 other states, and the District of 
Columbia, has adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act. See 7 Uniform 
Laws Annotated, Uniform Arbitration Act, 1955 Act, Table of 
Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted (Supp. 1992), at p.l. 
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Similarly, the losing party to an arbitration in 
Chauffeurs, Teamsters. Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No, 
135 v, Jefferson Trucking Co,, Inc., 628 F.2d 1023, 1027 (7th Cir. 
1980), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1125 (1981), never filed a motion to 
vacate the arbitrator's award within the time prescribed for such 
motions. Later, the successful party moved to enforce the 
arbitration award. Only then did the losing party raise its 
grounds to vacate the award, not affirmatively, but as "defenses.ft 
The sole issue in Jefferson Trucking was whether the losing party 
could raise, as defenses, objections that were untimely under the 
section of the arbitration statute dealing with motions to vacate. 
In holding that the losing party could not raise such untimely 
objections as "defenses," the Seventh Circuit held: 
Since the defendant failed to file such a 
motion within the time period prescribed by 
the statute, we hold the defendant is 
therefore barred from prosecuting its claim to 
invalidate the award. 
The conclusion that the defendant is barred by 
the statute of limitations from now seeking to 
invalidate the award finds additional support 
in the federal policy favoring voluntary 
arbitration as the most expedient method of 
resolving labor disputes. . . . As the 
district court observed, this policy would 
seem to condemn the conduct of the defendant 
who ignored an award disfavorable to it, 
failed to move to vacate the award, and then 
sought to be given its day in court when the 
plaintiff brought suit in frustration to have 
the arbitration award enforced. If the 
defendant's defenses were of such vital 
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importance to it, the defendant nevertheless 
had an opportunity to raise them in the manner 
contemplated by the statute. 
* * * 
Although the answer is not framed as a 
counterclaim, the "defenses" raised therein 
constitute a request for affirmative relief, 
namely, vacation of the arbitration award. A 
counterclaim for affirmative relief may not be 
asserted if barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
(citations omitted). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-12 provides, in part: "the court 
shall confirm the award unless a motion is timely filed to vacate 
or modify the award." (emphasis added). In this case, Development 
did not file a timely motion to vacate or modify the award. Its 
attempt was over five months late. 
By using the word "shall" the statute explicitly required 
the trial court to enter an order confirming the Award. See, e.g. , 
Varian-Eimac. Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 
1989)(when a statute uses the word "shall," the statute is 
mandatory). Because Development did not file a timely motion to 
vacate or modify the Award, this Court should affirm the trial 
courts order confirming the Award. 
Even if, however, Development had timely raised any of 
its objections to the Award, which it did not, none of these 
objections has legal merit. 
15 
B. THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT THE ARBITRATOR'S 
AWARD WAS PROCURED THROUGH FRAUD. 
At page 12 of its Brief, Development cavalierly asserts, 
without reference to the record, that two affidavits purportedly 
"created a material issue of fact as to whether [Trust] obtained 
the arbitration award through fraud." Development's assertion 
fails for two reasons. 
1. Development Has Failed To Marshal Any Evidence. 
Ordinarily, appellate courts concern themselves with the 
marshaling doctrine when an appellant does not marshal facts 
supporting the trial court's holding. See, e.g., State v. Larsen, 
828 P.2d 487, 490-91 (Utah App. 1992). Marshaling requires an 
appellant to act as a "devil's advocate." It requires an appellant 
to "present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence" supporting the trial court's decision. West 
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 
1991). Development has failed to marshal the evidence supporting 
the trial court's ruling. As a result this Court presumes that the 
clear weight of the evidence supports the trial court's decision. 
See, e.g. , State v. Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah App. 
1990). 
Moreover, Development has not marshaled any evidence in 
support of its own arguments. Nowhere in its Brief does 
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Development refer to a single point in the record that supports 
Development's factual assertions. Utah Appellate courts have 
repeatedly held they will not entertain appeals that lack adequate 
references to the record: 
"A reviewing court is entitled to have the 
issues clearly defined with pertinent 
authority cited and is not simply a depository 
in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument and research." State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)(quoting 
Williamson v. Qpsahl, 92 Ill.App.3d 1087, 
1089, 48 111.Dec. 510, 511, 416 N.E.2d 783, 
784 (1981)). The marshaling requirement 
provides the appellate court the basis from 
which to conduct a meaningful review of facts 
challenged on appeal. See Wright v. Westside 
Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 512 n.2 (Utah App. 
1990)(the purpose of the marshaling 
requirement is to spare appellate courts the 
onerous burden of combing through the record 
in search of supporting factual matters.) 
State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d at p.491. 
2. There is No Evidence in the Record to Support 
Developments Claim of Fraud. 
Even if Development had marshaled all relevant evidence, 
there is no competent evidence in the record supporting 
Development's claim of fraud. 
Development's own authority explicitly holds that 
affidavits such as the January 30, 1992 affidavit of Marc Kaplan 
(the "Kaplan Affidavit") are inadmissible: 
To raise a genuine issue of fact, an affidavit 
must do more than reflect the affiant's 
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opinions and conclusions . . . The mere 
assertion that an issue of fact exists without 
a proper evidentiary foundation to support 
that assertion is insufficient to preclude the 
granting of a summary judgment motion. 
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983). 
Development repeatedly contends the trial court 
overlooked "evidence" of fraud. Development fails to identify what 
"evidence" the trial court overlooked. In fact there was no such 
"evidence." The Kaplan Affidavit was rife with hearsay and 
unsupported conclusions. Utah appellate courts have long directed 
trial courts to ignore hearsay, opinions and factual statements 
lacking proper foundation when a party makes timely objections to 
objectionable portions of an affidavit. See, e.g.. Salt Lake City 
Corp. v. James Constructors Inc.. 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah App. 1988) . 
After Development filed the Kaplan Affidavit, Trust 
timely objected and requested the trial court to refuse to consider 
specified paragraphs of the Kaplan affidavit on grounds they were 
conclusory, lacked foundation, contained only his opinions and 
belief, were not admissible in evidence, and were insufficient as 
a matter of law to create an issue of material fact. (R. 83-84). 
Trust supported its objections with citations to relevant 
authority: Treloaaan v. Treloqqan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985); 
Williams v. Melbv. 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985); Walker v. Rockv 
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Mountain Recreation Corp, . 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538, 542 
(1973). (R. 83). 
Based on Trust's timely objections the trial court 
disregarded, as it should have, the objectionable portions of the 
Kaplan Affidavit. Cf^, Hardv v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 925 (Utah 
App. 1989). The trial court did not err in refusing to consider 
Development's conclusory, foundationless opinions and hearsay. 
There was no evidence of fraud before the trial court. 
In addition, a court can vacate an arbitration award only 
if "the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue 
means;. . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14(1)(a). 
Development's pleadings nowhere prove or even suggest 
that Trust procured the Award through fraud. Trust's Summary of 
Dispute (R. 53) states it had received a $400,000 offer. 
Development's Summary of Dispute (R. 55) gave the reasons it 
believed this $400,000 offer was not bona fide. Development 
admitted that the parties had fully empowered the arbitrator to 
determine "whether the offer submitted by [Trust] in the sum of 
$400,000 was a bona fide offer establishing the fair market value" 
of Lot 37. (R. 40). 
Development also admitted that at least since March of 
1991, Trust had listed Lot 37 for sale for $588,500. (R. 40). 
Additionally, during the Hearing Development introduced into 
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evidence an exhibit showing the listed prices for Bald Eagle lots 
as of April 15, 1991. (R. 106). Trust's listing price for Lot 37 
is the highest price shown for any lot in the Bald Eagle 
development. Another lot, Lot 11, is the same size as Lot 37, but 
was listed for only $435,000. (R. 106). The evidence at the 
Hearing therefore indicated that Trust was in fact attempting to 
maximize its recovery and minimize Development's financial 
obligation to Trust. 
All this evidence was before the Arbitrator and the trial 
court. Based upon that evidence, the Arbitrator determined, within 
the scope of his authority, that the $400,000 offer received by 
Trust was a bona fide offer as of the date of the Hearing. 
Development has not raised a single admissible material fact 
demonstrating that the finding by the arbitrator was "procured by 
corruption, fraud or other undue means" as required by § 78-31a-
14(1)(a). 
Section 78-31a-14(l) permits a court to vacate an 
arbitration award only if certain actions occurred at the time of 
the arbitration. Development does not claim, and in good faith 
cannot claim, that any of the after-occurring events it relies on 
had any effect on the arbitration process itself, even if the 
record did contain any competent evidence of the facts asserted by 
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Development. As Trust showed above, the record lacks any such 
evidence. 
3. Development Waived a Hearing. 
Finally, Development complains that the trial court's 
refusal to grant a hearing provides some basis for reversal. Trust 
filed its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings on January 16, 1992. (R. 22). Development filed its 
memorandum opposing that motion on February 4, 1992. (R. 36). 
Neither party requested oral argument at the time it filed its 
principal memorandum. Trust filed its reply memorandum on February 
10, 1992 (R. 80), with its counsel's affidavit of attorney fees. 
(R. 107). Trust also filed, on February 10, 1992, its Notice to 
Submit Motion for Decision (R. 120). On February 12, 1992, after 
the parties had filed all permitted pleadings, and Trust had filed 
its notice to submit, Development for the first time requested oral 
argument. (R. 115). On February 14, 1992 Development filed its 
objection to that request. (R. 117). Based on Trust's objection 
the trial court denied Development's untimely request. 
Rule 4-501(3)(f), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
provides: 
If no written request for a hearing was made 
at the time the parties filed their principal 
memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be 
deemed waived. (emphasis added). 
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Development's argument regarding "fraud" lacks merit. 
This Court should affirm the trial court.6 
C. THE TRIAL COURT LACKED THE AUTHORITY TO CONSIDER 
TRUST'S DAMAGES. 
1. This Court Should Not Consider This Issue Due to 
Trust's Failure to Comply With Appellate Rules. 
Development now claims the trial court erred in not 
taking evidence de novo concerning Trust's damages. Development 
did not raise this issue in its docketing statement. Except 
perhaps inferentially, Development did not raise this point before 
the trial court. Moreover, Development's third issue fails to 
comply with Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9) , which requires an argument to 
contain "citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
record relied on." Development's two-paragraph discussion of this 
issue ignores this requirement. 
6In its summary of its argument for its Point I, Development 
apparently claims the trial court failed to allow Development "a 
reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery." Although Development 
did not develop this assertion in the Argument section of its 
brief, Trust does want to address it briefly. Development never 
requested any additional time to conduct discovery. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56(f) provides the mechanism for requesting additional time for 
discovery. That rule, however, is not self-executing. A party 
seeking to avail itself of the Rule's benefits must affirmatively 
set forth the reasons why it needs additional time. See generally, 
Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 840-42 (Utah App. 
1987). Development never invoked Rule 56(f) or requested an 
extension. It accordingly was entitled to none. 
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When an appellate brief fails to provide any legal 
analysis or citation to legal authority setting forth the 
applicable legal principles in support of an appellant's contention 
that summary judgment was improperly entered against it, the Utah 
Supreme Court declines to rule on that issue, and affirms the trial 
court. See, e.g., Graco Fishing v. Ironwood Exploration. 766 P.2d 
1074, 1079 (Utah 1988). Similarly, this Court "has routinely 
declined to consider arguments which are not adequately briefed on 
appeal." State v. Yates. 189 U.A.R. 7, 9 (App. 1992). In such 
cases, this Court disregards the issue and affirms the order being 
appealed. See, e.g.. Johnson-Bowles v. Division of Securities. 829 
P.2d 101, 117 (Utah App. 1992). 
2. This Court and the Trial Court Are Without Power or 
Authority to Review the Merits of the Award. Including Its Award of 
Damages. 
The Utah Arbitration Act provide a method by which an 
arbitration award "may be given legal sanction and reduced to 
judgment by summary proceedings in the nature of a motion filed in 
court." Giannopulos v. Pappas. 80 Utah 442, 15 P.2d 353, 356 
(1932)(emphasis added). Utah law favors arbitration as a speedy 
and inexpensive method of adjudicating disputes. To serve that 
policy, judicial review of arbitration awards is strictly limited 
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to statutory grounds and procedures. See Robinson & Wells, P.C. v. 
Warren, 669 P.2d 844, 846 (Utah 1983). 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14(1), a court can vacate 
an arbitration award only on the following grounds: 
(a) the award was procured by corruption, 
fraud, or other undue means; 
(b) an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral, 
showed partiality, or an arbitrator was guilty 
of misconduct that prejudiced the rights of 
any party; 
(c) the arbitrators exceeded their powers; 
(d) the arbitrators refused to postpone the 
hearing upon sufficient cause shown, refused 
to hear evidence material to the controversy, 
or otherwise conducted the hearing to the 
substantial prejudice of the rights of a 
party; or 
(e) there was no arbitration agreement 
between the parties to the arbitration 
proceeding. 
A court is powerless to vacate an arbitration award on any other 
grounds. See Robinson & Wells, 669 P.2d at p. 847. None of these 
grounds permits judicial review of the merits of an arbitration 
award. This prohibition against judicial review of the merits of 
arbitration awards is rooted in the fundamental purposes of 
arbitration. 
Parties employing arbitration have agreed that an 
arbitrator's award is final and binding. They have bargained for 
the decision of an arbitrator not a court. See, e.g., Morrison-
Knudsen Co,. Inc. v. Makahuena Corp., 66 Hawaii 663, 675 P.2d 760, 
766 (1983); Board of Educ. Posen-Robbins School Dist. v. Daniels. 
108 Ill.App.3d 550, 64 111.Dec. 98, 439 N.E.2d 27, 30 (App. 1982); 
AFSCME Council 65. Local Union No. 667 v. Aitkin County. 357 N.W.2d 
432, 436 (Minn. App. 1984); Ridley School Dist. v. Ridley Educ. 
Ass'n.. 84 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 117, 479 A.2d 641, 643 (1984). 
The California Supreme Court recently explained the 
reason why arbitration awards are final and binding: 
The arbitrator's decision should be the end, 
not the beginning, of the dispute. 
Ensuring arbitral finality thus requires that 
judicial intervention in the arbitration 
process be minimized. Because the decision to 
arbitrate grievances evinces the parties' 
intent to bypass the judicial system and thus 
avoid potential delays at the trial and 
appellate levels, arbitral finality is a core 
component of the parties' agreement to submit 
to arbitration. Thus, an arbitration decision 
is final and conclusive because the parties 
have agreed that it be so. By ensuring that an 
arbitrator's decision is final and binding, 
courts simply assure that the parties receive 
the benefit of their bargain. 
Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase. 3 Cal.4th 1, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183, 832 
P.2d 899, 903 (1992)(citations omitted) (emphasis in opinion). 
Arbitration is not a mere prelude to litigation. See. 
City of Fairbanks Mun. Util. System v. Lees. 705 P.2d 457, 460 
(Alas. 1985). The Kansas Supreme Court has explained why 
arbitration would be a futile, meaningless exercise if courts took 
it upon themselves to review the merits of an arbitration award: 
The reason an arbitration award will not be 
considered de novo by a court is if it were 
otherwise, arbitration would only then be a 
dress rehearsal for litigation rather than an 
alternative to litigation. As noted recently 
by the Vermont supreme Court in R.E. Bean 
Constr. Co* v. Middleburv Assoc. , 139 Vt. 200, 
428 A.2d 306: 
"The courts must respect an 
arbitrator's determinations; 
otherwise, those determinations will 
merely add another expensive and 
time consuming layer to the already 
complex litigation process." 139 
Vt. at 204-05, 428 A.2d 306. 
Foley Co. v. Grindsted Prods., Inc., 233 Kan. 339, 662 P.2d 1254, 
1262-63 (1983). 
Almost 50 years ago, Judge Learned Hand identified the 
consequences of arbitration for parties who have agreed to 
arbitrate their dispute: 
Arbitration may or may not be a desirable 
substitute for trials in courts; as to that 
the parties must decide in each instance. But 
when they have adopted it, they must be 
content with its informalities; they may not 
hedge it about with those procedural 
limitations which it is precisely its purpose 
to avoid. They must content themselves with 
looser approximations to the enforcement of 
their rights than those that the law accords 
them, when they resort to its machinery. 
American Almond Products Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144 
F.2d 448, 451 (2d Cir. 1944). 
Because arbitration is final and binding, reviewing courts in 
states such as Utah that have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act 
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are prohibited from considering the merits of arbitration awards, 7 
See e.g. , Lees. 705. P.2d at p. 460 (Alaska); Arizona Public Serv. 
Co. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 149 Ariz. 239, 717 P.2d 
918, 922-23 (App. 1985); Foust v. Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co., 786 P.2d 
450, 451 (Colo. App. 1989); Harris v. Haught. 435 So.2d 926, 928 
(Fla. App. 1983); Jackson Trak Group v. Mid States Port Auth. . 242 
Kan. 683, 751 P.2d 122, 127 (1988); Taunton Mun. Light Plant Comm'n 
v. Geiringer & Assoc, 560 F.Supp. 1249, 1252 (D. 1983), aff 'd. . 
775 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1983) (applying Massachusetts codification of 
Uniform Arbitration Act); Byron Center Public Schools v. Kent 
County Educ. Ass'n.. 186 Mich. App. 29, 463 N.W.2d 112, 113 (App. 
1990); Beebout v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 365 N.W.2d 271, 
273 (Minn. App. 1985); Holman v. Trans World Airlines, 737 F.Supp. 
527, 530 (E.D. Mo. 1989)(applying Missouri codification of Uniform 
Arbitration Act); Glasgow Education Ass'n. v. Board of Trustees. 
Valley County. 242 Mont. 478, 791 P.2d 1367, 1371 (1990); Turner v. 
Nicholson Properties. Inc.. 80 N.C. App. 208, 341 S.E.2d 42, 45 
(App.) disc, review denied. 317 N.C. 714, 347 S.E.2d 457 (1986); 
Greater Johnstown Area Vocational-Technical School v. Greater 
7The Uniform Arbitration Act is national in character and § 78-
31a-14 is uniform with § 12 of the Uniform Arbitration Act. 
Accordingly, this Court relies on case law from other Uniform 
Arbitration Act jurisdictions to interpret the meaning and effect 
of § 78-31a-14. Cf. , Power Systems & Controls. Inc. v. Keiths 
Elect. Const. Co.. 765 P.2d 5, 10 n.2 (Utah App. 1988) 
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Johnstown Vocational-Technical Educ. Ass'n., 88 Pa. Commonwealth 
Ct. 141, 489 A.2d 945, 948 n.4 (1985). 
As part of this prohibition against reviewing the merits of 
arbitration awards, courts cannot review an arbitrator7s award of 
damages under the Uniform Arbitration Act: 
If the arbitrators in assessing damages commit 
an error of law or fact, but do not overstep 
the limits of the issues submitted to them, a 
court may not substitute its judgment on the 
matter. 
City of Lawrence v. Falzarano, 380 Mass. 18, 402 N.E.2d 1017, 1024 
(1980). See also. Foley Co. v. Grindsted Products Inc., 233 Kan. 
339, 662 P.2d 1254, 1261-62 (1983)(interpreting Kansas and Maryland 
codifications of Uniform Arbitration Act); Seither & Cherry Co. v. 
Illinois Bank Bldq. Corp., 95 Ill.App.3d 191, 50 111.Dec. 672, 419 
N.E.2d 940, 945 (App. 1981). 
3. Neither This Court Nor the Trial Court Can Consider 
Evidence Not Before the Arbitrator. 
Development seeks to vacate the Award based on new evidence 
not presented to the Arbitrator at the arbitration Hearing. In 
jurisdictions such as Utah that have adopted the Uniform 
Arbitration Act, courts refuse to vacate arbitration awards based 
on claims of new evidence. See, Flight Systems v. Paul A. Laurence 
Co. . 715 F.Supp. 1125, 1129 (D.D.C. 1989)(applying Virginia 
codification of Uniform Arbitration Act). Cf., Shearson Hayden 
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Stone, Inc. v. Liana, 653 F.2d 310, 313 (7th Cir. 1981)(applying 
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.); Central Gen. 
Hospital v. Hanover Ins. Co.. 49 N.Y.2d 950, 428 N.Y.S.2d 881, 406 
N.E.2d 739, 740 (1980)(applying New York (non-Uniform) statutes). 
In short, when parties have agreed, as here, to arbitrate a dispute 
they "are bound bv the arbitration award made upon the testimony 
before the arbitrator." Bridgeport Rolling Mills Co. v. Brown, 314 
F.2d 885, 886 (2d Cir.), cert, denied. 375 U.S. 821 (1963) (emphasis 
added). 
Brown is a short, but illuminating decision. The employer 
fired Brown because it suspected him of stealing materials. The 
arbitrator found the testimony against Brown to be "mere rumor and 
gossip," and ordered Brown reinstated. Id. at p. 885. After the 
arbitration award the employer sought to vacate the award based on 
new evidence that Brown perjured himself at the arbitration 
hearing. The employer claimed this resulted in a fraudulent award. 
Rejecting the employer's arguments the court held: 
That the employer at the time his motion was 
presented to the district court may have had, 
or may now have, sufficient evidence to 
justify a discharge of Brown for cause if he 
were now in the employer's employ is 
irrelevant to the issues the arbitrator heard 
and has no bearing upon the arbitrator's 
determination that the employer did not have 
just cause to discharge him in 1961. Brown's 
guilt, if now proved, does not require the 
conclusion that the arbitrator's award, when 
made, was procured by fraud, for the decision 
of the arbitrator was based upon the failure 
of the employer's proof to convince rather 
than on the strength of Brown's alleged 
perjurious testimony. 
Id. at pp. 885-86. Accordingly, the Brown court affirmed the 
trial court's refusal to consider the employer's new evidence. 
In American Almond Products Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales 
Co., 144 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1944), the parties had agreed to submit 
to arbitration a dispute concerning the damages a buyer of nuts 
suffered as a result of the seller's nondelivery. The arbitrator 
awarded the buyer specified damages, and the buyer petitioned the 
district court to confirm that award. The seller moved to vacate 
the award on the grounds there was no evidence regarding damages 
before the arbitrator other than a single statement in the brief of 
buyer's attorney. The district court denied seller's motion to 
vacate, and entered judgment on the award, holding that the mere 
claim for damages in the attorney's brief was adequate basis for 
the arbitrator's award of damages. Id. at p. 449. In affirming 
the trial court, Judge Learned Hand wrote: 
Had the parties at bar submitted evidence upon 
the issue of damages, and the arbitrators 
looked elsewhere, it might have been 
"misbehavior"; but it was not "misbehavior" to 
settle a controversy meant to be finally 
disposed of, by the only means open to the 
arbitrators, as the case stood. 
Id. at p. 451. 
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Appellate courts, including the trial court, which essentially 
served in an appellate role in this case, cannot review evidence 
that was not introduced at the arbitration hearing. The cases make 
this clear. The trial court and this Court can consider only 
evidence presented to the arbitrator. 
This prohibition against considering new evidence, moreover, 
is not unique to the review of arbitration awards: 
For the purpose of determining whether a 
verdict is or is not excessive, an appellate 
court will consider only the same evidence as 
was considered by the jury, but will not 
consider after trial facts presented to the 
appellate court by motion. Affidavits filled 
[sic] or obtained after the trial in the court 
below was completed may not be considered by 
the appellate court as part of the evidence in 
the case. 
5. Am.Jur.2d APPEAL AND ERROR, § 736. See also, 5 C.J.S., APPEAL 
& ERROR § 1487 (matters occurring after ruling objected to will not 
be considered). 
The trial court would have committed legal error if it 
considered after-occurring evidence not before the Arbitrator. 
Development does not dispute that the value of Lot 37 was the 
central issue decided by the Arbitrator. Even if the evidence at 
the Hearing was wholly lacking, or if Development may now have new 
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evidence/ this Court should affirm the trial court's Order and 
8As Trust has shown above, Development's arguments regarding 
new evidence are legally ineffective. They also are factually 
unsupported and do not indicate any "windfall" or injustice at all. 
As Trust argued to the trial court: 
[Development's] statement at p. 5 of its Objection [to 
the trial court's Order and Judgment] that the $400,000 
price "has never been established to have been a good 
faith offer consistent to the fair market value of the 
property" is simply wrong. [Development] argued 
throughout the arbitration that the $400,000 figure was 
too low. The Arbitrator considered all the documents 
[Development] now parades before this Court. After 
considering [Development's] argument and these same 
documents, the Arbitrator specifically found the fair 
market value of the property was $400,000. The Court has 
now confirmed the Award containing that finding. 
As a result, [Development's] "windfall" argument is 
irrelevant. It is also inaccurate and misguided in the 
following respects: (1) it states—contrary to the 
record, and without any basis—that [Trust] received 
$570,000 for Lot 37; (2) it ignores all closing costs 
[Trust] incurred in a $570,000 sale;. . . (3) it ignores 
the fact that [Trust] has been paying property taxes on 
Lot 37 since June 23, 1989; and (4) it ignores the fact 
that [Trust] has either been paying interest on, or has 
lost the opportunity to invest, $442,200 since June 23, 
1989. 
[Development's] argument does nothing more than encourage 
the Court to speculate. The court could just as easily 
speculate that if all of [Trust's] costs were considered, 
[Trust] has lost money. There is no reason for the Court 
to speculate at all, however. The Arbitrator heard all 
the evidence now urged by [Development] on this Court, 
and issued his Award ordering [Development] to pay 
[Trust] $188,500. The Award conclusively fixed 
[Development's] debt to [Trust] at $188,500. The Court 
confirmed that Award when it granted [Trust's] Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings. 
[Development's] Objection is its last desperate attempt 
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Judgment confirming the Award. 
to avoid the conclusive liability imposed almost a year 
ago by the Arbitrator on [Development]. The Objection is 
without any foundation in law, in reality, or in the 
record. It is contrary to the unambiguous language of 
the Arbitrator's Award. It is nothing more than a 
transparent and futile effort by [Development] to 
litigate this entire matter for the third time. 
(R. 145-46). 
In addition, many things changed in the intervening ten 
months, including a dramatic reduction in interest rates. 
When interest rates fall, land prices typically rise. 
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D. THE ELECTION OF REMEDIES DOCTRINE HAS NOTHING TO DO 
WITH THIS CASE. 
Development admits, as it must, that the purpose of the 
election of remedies doctrine is to prevent double recovery• This 
Court has recognized this rule: 
The doctrine of election of remedies is a 
technical rule of procedure and its purpose is 
not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to 
prevent double redress for a single wrong. 
Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 
P.2d 772, 778 (Utah 1983)(quoting, Roval 
Resources, Inc. v. Gibraltar Financial Corp., 
603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1979)). 
Robert Lanaston, Ltd. v. McOuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 556 n.2 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (1987). 
The Utah Supreme Court explained the operation of the election 
of remedies doctrine: 
The doctrine of election of remedies applies 
as a bar only where the two actions are 
inconsistent, generally based upon 
incompatible facts; the doctrine does not 
operate as an estoppel where the two or more 
remedies are given to redress the same wrong 
and are consistent. Where the remedies 
afforded are inconsistent, it is the election 
of one that bars the other; but where they are 
consistent, it is the satisfaction that 
operates as a bar. 
Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 4 Utah 
2d 155, 289 P.2d 1045, 1049 (1955). When remedies are consistent, 
a party may permissibly pursue them singly or together until it has 
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one satisfaction. See Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 
399, 401 (1964). 
This matter, however, does not involve a double recovery. It 
does not involve inconsistent remedies. Rather, it merely involves 
a judgment creditor's efforts to collect on an arbitration award. 
In this context, M[t]he doctrine of election of remedies does not 
apply to the successive steps taken by a judgment creditor to 
enforce his judgment." 28 C.J.S., ELECTION OF REMEDIES, § 3 at p. 
1065. See also, Trahan v. Trahan, 455 A.2d 1307, 1312 (R.I. 
1983)(judgment creditor can pursue distinct remedies 
simultaneously); Lipton v. Lipton, 211 Ga. 442, 86 S.E.2d 299, 302 
(1955)(judgment creditor may concurrently pursue all available 
remedies to obtain satisfaction of judgment and neither can be 
pleaded in abatement of the other until judgment creditor receives 
full satisfaction.) 
Development requested, and received from Trust, an additional 
4 5 days after the date of the Award to repurchase Lot 37 for 
$588,500. Development did not take advantage of that extension. 
When Developments extension to repurchase Lot 37 for $588,500 
expired, Trust was entitled, pursuant to the Award, to retain Lot 
37, and to commence efforts to collect "$188,500 plus interest at 
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10% from March 28, 1991 until paid."9 (Award, R. 101; Exhibit "D" 
to Addendum). 
Consequently, Trust advised Development on July 16, 1991 that 
Trust had requested the escrow agent to liquidate the escrowed lots 
held for security so Trust could recover the $188,500 awarded it by 
the Arbitrator. (R. 64; Exhibit "F" to Addendum). Development can 
point to nothing in the record showing Trust ever received any 
proceeds pursuant to that request to the escrow agent. 
When that effort to collect on the Award failed, Trust filed 
its Petition, still seeking to recover the same $188,500 awarded it 
9The Award did not give Development its choice between paying 
Trust $188,500 and repurchasing Lot 37 for $588,500. Rather, it 
ordered Development to pay Trust $188,500, but, in a proviso, gave 
Development seven days from the initial award within which to 
repurchase Lot 37 in lieu of making the ordered payment: 
Respondent, Marc Development, a corporation, is ordered 
to pay to Claimant, Arthur Mintz, Trustee of the Mintz 
Family Trust, $188,500 plus interest at 10% from March 
28, 1991 until paid. Provided, however, in lieu of 
paying the foregoing award to Claimant, Respondent shall 
have the option of repurchasing Unit 37 of The Bald Eagle 
Club at Deer Valley from Claimant, on or before May 30, 
1991 for $588,500.00 in cash, the burden of giving 
notice to Claimant of such election and arranging for 
closing being on Respondent. (R.101; Exhibit MD" to 
Addendum) 
The Award could not have been clearer that it was an award of 
damages against Development, and that whether Development bought 
Lot 37 for $588,500, or paid Trust $188,500, Development was 
required by the Award to reimburse Trust in cash for the difference 
between the guaranteed price of Lot 37 ($588,500) and its fair 
market value on March 23, 1991 ($400,000). 
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by the Arbitrator. The trial court's confirmation of the Award did 
not permit Trust a double recovery. To the contrary, it only 
permitted Trust to treat the Award as a judgment, and to begin 
execution on the Award it received over a year ago, but on which it 
has yet to recover. 
At page 14 of its brief, Development makes the puzzling 
assertion that Trust's request to the escrow agent had the effect 
"of forcing [Development] to repurchase the lot [37] rather than 
accept the monetary award of the arbitrator. As a consequence, 
[Trust] has waived the monetary portion of the arbitration award 
and, therefore, the award is null and void. . .'• However, 
Development cites no authority or rationale for this assertion. 
The building lot that was subject to the parties' agreement 
was Lot 37. (R. 50). The lots deposited into escrow, however, 
were lots 11, 12, 18 and 19. (R. 60). When Trust requested the 
escrow agent to liquidate the assets securing Development's 
performance, it requested a liquidation of Lots 11, 12, 18 and 19. 
Trust requested the liquidation so it could recover the monetary 
Award made by the Arbitrator. This action did not amount to waiver 
of the monetary portion of the Award. To the contrary, Trust 
stated in its July 16, 1991 letter (R. 64) that Development had 
forfeited any rights under the Award or the extension to reacquire 
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Lot 37. Trust accordingly sought to recover the monetary amount of 
the Award through sale of the escrowed security. 
In addition, Development escrowed lots 11, 12, 18 and 19 "to 
secure the guaranty" of Development. Part of that guaranty was 
Development's promise to pay Trust the difference between $588,500 
and the fair market value of Lot 37 as of March 23, 1991. (R. 5, 
60; Exhibits "B", "C" to Addendum). Lots 11, 12, 18 and 19 
therefore served as security for Development's debt to Trust. The 
Award merely liquidated the amount of the indebtedness Development 
assumed in its Letter of Guarantee, and ordered Development to 
honor the indebtedness it assumed in its Letter of Guarantee. (R. 
5-6, Exhibit "B" to Addendum). The Utah one-action rule, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-37-1, consequently required Trust to proceed first 
against Lots 11, 12, 18 and 19. This requirement of § 78-37-1 
presents yet another reason why Development's interpretation of the 
election of remedies doctrine is incorrect. 
Finally, as Trust has shown in the immediately preceding 
subpart of its Argument, a court can vacate an arbitration award 
only on statutory grounds. A court cannot vacate on any other 
grounds. Development asks the Court to vacate the Award based on 
events happening after the Hearing was over and the Award issued. 
Development makes no claim the arbitration procedure itself was 
flawed with respect to its election of remedies argument. 
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Development nowhere cites any statutory authority for this election 
of remedies argument, and none exists. 
The doctrine of election of remedies does not apply under 
these circumstances. It consequently provides no basis for 
reversal of the trial court. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Appellee respectfully urges this Court to AFFIRM the trial 
court's Order and Judgment. 
DATED September 3D 1992. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ANDERSON & WATKINS 
Glen D. Watkins > \ / J O 
Bruce Wycoff K*)****^ 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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46 MAR 2 5 1992 icft 
Clerk of Summit County 
BY * W / V ^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR MINTZ# Trustee of the 
Mintz Family Trust, 
Petitioner/ 
vs. 
MARC DEVELOPMENT/ a corporation/ 
Respondent. 
I ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
I Case No. 11174 
I Judge Homer Wilkinson 
The Petitioner having filed its Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings on January 16, 1992; the Respondent having filed its 
Memorandum in Opposition; Petitioner having filed its Reply Brief; 
the Court having considered the moving papers, being fully advised 
therein, having issued its Memorandum Decision dated February 19, 
1992, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Petitioner's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is 
granted. 
000153 
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2. The May 30, 1991 Arbitration Award, which is the subject 
of the Petition herein, is confirmed. 
3. Judgment is entered in favor of Petitioner and against 
Respondent in the principal amount of $188,500, together with 
Interest from March 28, 1991 through February 24, 
1992 in the amount of $17,197.40; 
Interest at the rate of $51.64 per day from 
February 25, 1992, until the date of entry of this 
Order and Judgment; and 
Interest from and after the entry of this Order and 
Judgment at the rate of 12% per annum, until paid. 
4. Attorneys' fees as allowed by arbitration statutes are 
awarded subject to objection by the Respondent and review of the 
Court. 
JUDGMENT RENDERED this > **» day of *h\ <*~-e^<L~, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Homer F. Wilkinson 
District Court Judge 
WMU'-M*41* 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this 24th day of February, 1992, I hereby caused to be 
telecopied, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT, to the following: 
Thomas T. Billings, Esq. (801) 534-0058 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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CLERK'S MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT, postage prepaid, via the U.S. mail, 
on the 1^ day of VYVan, , 1992, addressed to the 
following: 
Thomas T. Billings, Esq. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Glen D. Watkins 
ANDERSON & WATKINS 
700 Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Ofry & GU/^vjL, fl^-fr. foJe, 
(K:MIN91089\0224O4J.35A) 
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Letter of Guarantee 
*\\JTu FA«*i Ifair on> >-W* 
To: Arthur M. Mintz-tSu^rc^ 
50 Foxhill 
Woodside, California 84062 
From: Mark Kaplan 
Hare Development 
Bald Eagle Club 
Park City, Utah 84060 
In reference to our recent discussion regarding the Bald Eagle 
Club and your Homesite choice of t J i 2 » Mark Kaplan and 
Marc Development hereby agree to the following: 
1. You shall receive an 8% discount from the published 
price for you Homesite as Indicated in the attached Exhibit A* 
2. You shall receive an additional discount from said 
price noted above in the amount of $50,000. 
3 . If at any time during the 20 months from the date of 
c los ing , any price reduction from the original price l i s t that i s 
offered to any other lot purchaser, the same price reduction 
shal l be granted to you, 
4. In addition, you shall be guaranteed herein the 
following at the end of 20 months from the date of closing: 
1. The lot shall be deemed to be worth 10% above the 
or ig inal published price in Exhibit A by virtue of the following: 
a. Purchaser shall build or keep said lo t . 
b. Seller shall have the obligation and option 
to pay the difference between Buyer's sale price at that time and 
the 10% increase price as indicated below, or, 
c. at the Se l l er ' s option, Se l ler shal l be 
obl igated to purchase the lot for said amount of the guarantee 
indicated below, 
Original Price List Exhibit A for Lot * 3 1 i s $ ^3^:too 
Final Special Discount Price: $ */V7.%ZOO . 
Guaranteed Price at the end of 20 months: S 
*n 
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In order to guarantee that funds shall be available to support 
the above guarantees, Seller hereby agrees to deed Into escrow 
with High Country Title Company, the deeds to four Bald Eagle 
Homesites free and clear of all encumbrances to inure to the 
benefit of the Buyers, the payment of said guarantees. These 
homesites shall be transferable and nonexlusive so that a minimum 
of four homesites shall always remain in escrow throughout the 20 
month period. 
Entered into this 1Z** day of NJU.^*_ 1989. 
Marc Development, Seller 
PresiaVent 
Arthur Mints , { ^ T » •, 
r7Encr Cm 7-I'M 
V k ^ . 7itMSrtx. 
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DEPOSIT IN E8O0W 
The undersigned Hare Developments inc., Ian Illinois 
Corporation (Depositor)! does hereby deposit intd escrow with 
High Country Title Company, a Utah Corporation and a title 
agency, of Park City, Utah (Truetee), fee title. Ifree and clear 
of encumbrances, to Units ll,_jy2, 18 , end^ 19. inclusive, of the 
Bald Eagle Club at Deer valley, V"0feh "Expendable] Condominium 
Project, (The Condominium Project) at recorded ixi the Office of 
the County Recorder of Summit County, State of Utjah, 
on Amount 3. 1989 ae Entry No. 311266 , in Book J30 
beginning at Page 20S ,'and pursuant to Recor 
recorded on ^ SHilJlJiS?. ** E n t r y No' ?lli6*_ 
Property). The terns and conditions or the Tru$ 
follows: 
j [ ti 
trust! 
Survey Map 
(The Trust 
ere as 
i. The Trust Property la deposited tobsecure the 
guaranty of Depositor with regard to no more than] ten units 
couUlneO in the Condominium Project. At the undent the 
guaranty applies to Units to be purchased by the 
indicated below; 
>ereona 
1. 
a. 
9» 
a. 
9. 
6. 
7. 
Unit 37 
Unit 39 
Unit 5 
Unit 36 
Unit 2» 
Unit 20 
Unit 34 
Arthur Hunts, Trusts* 
Cherle» Gibson 
Nail and Jane Parry 
Jam** and Susan 8wests 
Huseell and Dawn N&lpon 
Tom and Otey Oust 
John J. and CuriMty *;. Mack 
ltuigu'9. Mill 
The foregoing individuals ere indicated fts 
beneficiaries. A copy of the Guaranty between Depositor and 
each of the individual beneficiaries 16 attached pereto and 
incorporated herein ae infoxmatlvn and direction to the Trustee. 
2. Depositor shall hav« a Right of Subetitutio 
regard to the Trust Property sueh that if Depositor 
sole discretion, should determine that it desltesf 
the Trust of one ur more of the Units constituting 
Property, Depositior may receive luch release immediately 
the deposit by Depositor in Trust under the terms 
conditions of vhis Deposit in Escrow of another uhit 
Condominium Project, free and dear of encumbrances. 
n with 
in its 
release from 
the) Trust 
upon 
and 
in the 
At all 
• in «h« vtXI«a of tha SunaU County Rtcordat and raeord«d aufcuat 3, 1989 AM 
Entry No. 149483 In Book 210 at Fits 3S» and tb* Racord ofTsurvay Map recorded 
August 3, 1989 «t entry No. U9A82 In Book 210 »e »**• 35o)of ths official 
r«c«rd* in the office of tbe Wasatch County Racgrdar. 
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times .during the terms of this Trust* fouc units |in the 
Condominium Project, free and dear of encumbrance*, shall 
remain in the escrow. 
3. The term of this Escrow oorwnences <si the dote 
hereof and shall exist for a period of thirty «iJ <3&) months 
unless earlier terminated by agreement signed bybepo&UuL and 
the beneficiaries hereof. The benefficierlea agrJe that they 
will sign an agreement terminating the Escrow etjany time thai 
there remains no longer at issue any of the obligations under 
th» individual Letters of Guaranty applicable tolthe particular 
beneficiary. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the {Escrow shall 
continue during any periods that the Trust Propenty in the 
Escrow is under litigation, until sueh litigation la complete 
and nonappealable. 
4. The Trustee shall respond to the ddaw-dovn by a 
particular beuefloiaiy wilh regard to the Ttust Ikoperty if the 
beneficiary sends to the Trustee during the tern bf the Escrow, 
a written Affidavit that U ) Depositor became obligated under 
the terms and condition! of beneficiary's Letter pf Guaranty to 
pay sums to beneficiary, (2) Beneficiary made denland upon 
Depositor for the payment of such sums pursuant tto the tetter 
of GWtauiy, <3) Tulity days have elapsed from U s demand upon 
Depositor and Depositor has failed to pay the sum owed 
beneficiary under the Letter of Guaranty. When Truetee 
receives such a demand by Affidavit from a beneficiary, Trustee 
shall immediately transmit a copy of such demand co Depot 1 tor, 
and if Depositor fails to satisfy beneficiary, unjiess otherwise 
enjoined by a competent court of law, fifteen d a w after the 
mailing of such beneficiaiy's demand to Depositor], Trustee 
shall place on the m&rKet for sale by suitable rekl estate 
listing, all of the Truat Properties and from thef first 
proceeds from the sale of the first unit to be solid and closed 
o£ the Trust Properties, shall pay the demand of the demanding 
beneficiary, as indicated by his Affidavit. 
5. As soon as all beneficiary demands and potential 
demands have been met by Trustee, or as soon as the term of the 
Escrow expires without demand by beneficiaries, all remaining 
Trust Proportion shall be conveyed by Trustee's Deed back to 
Depositui and the Escrow elosed. 
ft. Truitee shall have the obligations tf reasonable 
care with regard to the Trust Propertits and the terms and 
conditions of this Escrow but, with the exception!of gross 
uegligence or willful damaging acts* Trustee shall not be 
-2- 000061 
liable to Depositor or to the beneficiaries or afy of them vUft 
regard to the Eeorow Age••ment end/or the Truit Iroperty. 
DATED this day fif July, 1969. 
MARC DEVELOPMENT, XlC, an 
Illinois £6r&»t'atioL 
The Terms and Conditions of Escrow accepted. Tidltf to thB 
foregoing Trust Property having been conveyed to {Trustee is 
acknowledged. 
HTGH COUNTRY WttEy 
Millace Buchanan, President 
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071189 
nfifcneo 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL 
In the Matter of the Arbitration between: 
Arthur Mintz, Trustee of the Mintz 
Family Trust, Claimant 
-and-
Marc Development, a corporation. Respondent 
CASE NUMBER: 81 115 0017 91 
AMENDED AWARD OF ARBITRATOR 
I, THE UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR, having been designated in accordance with the 
Arbitration Agreement entered into by the above-named parties, and dated July 
20, 1989, and having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and 
allegations of the parties, FIND and AVARD as follows: 
Respondent, Marc Development, a corporation, is ordered to pay to Claimant, 
Arthur Mintz, Trustee of the Mintz Family Trust, $188,500,00 plus interest at 
10% from March 28, 1991 until paid. Provided, however, in lieu of paying the 
foregoing award to Claimant, Respondent shall have the option of repurchasing 
Unit 37 of The Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley from Claimant, on or before May 
30, 1991 for $588,500.00 in cash, the burden of giving notice to Claimant of 
such election and arranging for closing being on Respondent. If Respondent 
shall exercise this option, each party shall pay the closing costs customarily 
allocated to buyer and seller, as applicable, but no real estate commission 
shall be payable by Claimant. Claimant shall cooperate in effecting such a 
closing. 
The administrative fee and expenses of the American Arbitration Association 
shall be borne by Respondent and paid as directed by the American Arbitration 
Association. Each party shall bear their own expenses. 
This Award is in full settlement of all claims submitted to this 
arbitration. 
Dated this3f_*fcay of May, 1991. 
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OB MARC Construction & Development Cor 
1629 Colonial Parkway Inverness, Bnois 60067 (708)359-6024 fa* 7& 1&i S W / 
May 29,1991 
Mr. Arthur Mintz 
50FoxhiU 
Woodside, California 94062 
Dear Arthur: 
This letter will serve as an agreement between Marc Development and Arthur Mintz for 
Marc Development to purchase Lot 37 in the Bald Eagle Community of Deer Valley for 
the purchase price of $588,500. The closing will take place on or before July 15, 1991, 
and interest will be paid from May 30, 1991, at the rate of 2 points over Harris Bank of 
Chicago's prime rate until the closing takes place. All custpmary closing costs will be 
paid by the respective parties.-f30c fte*47fc*>C ASSUME exoc/uo- D*t» s-lo - ? / . 
In addition, it is agreed that the property will be listed for sale on the market 
immediately with Janet Olch at a price to be determined by Marc Development 
Sincere! 
MarkO. 
President 
MOK:keo 
Agreed byV 
Date: M*V 3o (99/ 
uusr*^ M^rt FAM/^Y iwr 
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(415)851-1883 Res. 
(415)851-8787 OFF. 
July 16,1991 
Mr. Hark 0. Kaplan 
Marc Development 
1629 Colonial Parkway 
Inverness, Illinois 60067 
NOTICE OF DEFAULT AND BREACH OF AGREEMENT 
You are hereby notified that pursuant to the Arbitration Award 
of the American Arbitration Association dated May 30, 1991, 
and your subsequent letter agreement of May, 1991 extending 
the terms for your payment for Lot #37, Bald Eagle Development, 
you are in default in the purchase contemplated in our above 
agreements. 
All necessary documentation, deeds, title insurance and closing 
statements were available for the closing with High Country Title 
Company* 
Accordingly, please be advised that your failure to honor the 
above described payment committments has resulted in substantial 
damage and inconvenience to the Mintz Family Trust which was 
entitled to rely on your promise to pay. 
By your failure to comply with your agreement, you have forfeited 
any rights to reacquire Lot #37, and are responsible for payment 
of $188,500 plus interest to July 15,1991 of $7724, plus interest 
on $188,500 from July 15f199l to the date this debt is paid, 
plus whatever additional costs and legal fees may be Incurred as 
a result of your default. 
I have advised High Country Title of this situation, and requested, 
pursuant to the Deposit in Escrow, that they place for sale the 
four lots held by them to protect beneficiaries , and to apply 
the first recovered proceeds of a sale to the above described 
amounts due the Mintz Family Trust. 
This notice is not intented to excuse any action for damages 
resulting from your default or breach of Contract. 
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